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Beginning in the 1950s, a group of scholars primarily associated with the University of Chicago began to challenge many of the fundamental tenants of antitrust
law. This movement, which became known as the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, profoundly altered the course of American antitrust scholarship, regulation, and
enforcement. What is not known, however, is the degree to which Chicago School
ideas influenced the antitrust regimes of other countries. By leveraging new datasets
on antitrust laws and enforcement around the world, we empirically explore whether
ideas embraced by the Chicago School diffused internationally. Our analysis illustrates that many ideas explicitly rejected by the Chicago School—such as using antitrust law to promote goals beyond efficiency or regulate unilateral conduct—are
common features of antitrust regimes in other countries. We also provide suggestive
evidence that the influence of the antitrust revolution launched by the Chicago
School has been more limited outside of the United States.
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movement have a more profound effect than in antitrust. The law
and economics movement led antitrust law and scholarship in the
United States to become increasingly informed by economic theories. Formalistic per se rules that used to characterize US antitrust doctrine gave way to a case-by-case assessment of the economic effects of firm conduct. As a result, antitrust enforcement
increasingly began to rely on economic experts, theoretical models, and econometrics studies that are now all but mandatory in
antitrust litigation.1
This shift in US antitrust policy marked the triumph of ideas
championed by scholars associated with the University of Chicago.2
The “Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis”3 (Chicago School) used
rigorous microeconometric analysis to change antitrust enforcers’
focus from economic power to economic incentives.4 This new focus, combined with a more conservative judiciary, led to a gradual
reversal of many previously established antitrust doctrines5—
from the prosecution of vertical mergers6 to the per se treatment
of several forms of unilateral conduct.7 Although antitrust scholars may disagree on the appropriateness of the Chicago School
1
See Michael R. Baye and Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 54
J Law & Econ 1, 6, 8 (2011) (conducting a survey of 714 antitrust cases in federal and
administrative courts and finding that, collectively, the cases mentioned the terms “expert
reports” 332 times, “statistics” 290 times, “expert witnesses” 230 times, and “regression”
113 times). See also Patrick R. Ward, Comment, Testing for Multisided Platform Effects
in Antitrust Market Definition, 84 U Chi L Rev 2059, 2070–71 (2017) (commenting on the
rise of complex economic arguments in market definition).
2
See, for example, Andrew I. Gavil, William E. Kovacic, and Jonathan B. Baker,
Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts, and Problems in Competition Policy 66–67
(West 2d ed 2008) (noting how the Chicago School “altered the terms of antitrust debate”
to include price theory and concepts such as market power, entry, and efficiency).
3
See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U Pa L Rev
925, 925–26 (1979).
4
Filippo Maria Lancieri, Digital Protectionism? Antitrust, Data Protection, and the
EU/US Transatlantic Rift, 7 J Antitrust Enforcement 27, 33 (2019).
5
See id.
6
An example of a vertical merger challenge is the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brown Shoe Co, Inc v United States, 370 US 294 (1962). In that case, the Court enjoined
a merger in which the combined vertical market share of both companies did not reach
10 percent of the national market, and, as evidence of potential anticompetitive harm, the
Court noted that in 118 cities the combined horizontal market share of companies exceeded 5 percent. Id at 327, 343. See also Michael H. Riordan and Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 Antitrust L J 513, 513–14 (1995)
(discussing how the Chicago School’s critique of Brown Shoe and other challenges to vertical mergers led to a more permissive policy).
7
See Continental Television, Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US 36, 57 (1977); State
Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3, 18 (1997); Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc,
551 US 877, 907 (2007) (reversing per se policies that had been in force for decades). See
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ideas, few would question the profound influence those ideas have
had on US antitrust policy.
An open question remains, however, whether the Chicago
School has influenced the antitrust policies of other countries. Anecdotal examples indicate a complex picture. For instance, several
countries recognize an efficiency defense—that is, justifications
used to approve an otherwise anticompetitive merger because of
the various efficiencies the merger is expected to generate—in assessing the competitive effects of mergers.8 This practice is very
much in line with the Chicago School’s ideas. But at the same
time, enforcement against unilateral conduct of dominant firms
remains vigorous in many jurisdictions (at least when compared
to the United States), including the European Union.9 This practice is in tension with the Chicago School view that unilateral conduct rarely calls for an antitrust intervention.10 Moreover, Chicago
scholars also strongly condemned the use of antitrust laws for redistributive ends or the promotion of industrial policy. For them,
it would be disconcerting to learn that several countries list the
promotion of employment or of national industries as a goal of
antitrust laws or evaluate mergers based on whether they advance the “public interest.”
In this Essay, we seek to go beyond these anecdotes and empirically measure the Chicago School’s international influence. To
do so, we leverage two recently created datasets on antitrust regimes around the world.11 The first—the Comparative Competition Law Dataset—provides detailed coding on the provisions of
the antitrust statutes of 131 jurisdictions from their first adoption
through 2010. The second—the Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset—provides data on the enforcement resources
also Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2, 12–18 (1984) (upholding the
per se rule against tying, but nonetheless limiting courts’ ability to find such conduct illegal in the absence of market power).
8
See Anu Bradford and Adam S. Chilton, Competition Law Around the World from
1889 to 2010: The Competition Law Index, 14 J Competition L & Econ 393, 410 (2018)
(noting that as of 2010, at least forty-five countries had an efficiency defense).
9
See, for example, Google Search (Shopping), ECComm 1 (AT.39740) (June 27,
2017) (finding that Google infringed on EU antitrust rules by displaying its own shopping
service more favorably than competing shopping services in its search results); Antitrust:
Commission Fines Google €4.34 Billion for Illegal Practices Regarding Android Mobile Devices to Strengthen Dominance of Google’s Search Engine (European Commission, July 18,
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/2955-H28S.
10 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 928 (cited in note 3).
11 See Anu Bradford, et al, Competition Law Gone Global: Introducing the Comparative
Competition Law and Enforcement Datasets, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud 411, 412–13 (2019).
See also Bradford and Chilton, 14 J Competition L & Econ at 394–95 (cited in note 8).
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and activities of 112 antitrust agencies between 1990 and 2010.
Together, these datasets provide a detailed picture of the world’s
antitrust regimes across countries and over time.
As these data illustrate, since the Chicago School’s antitrust
revolution, the number of countries with antitrust regimes has
soared. Figure 1 shows that in 1979, at the end of the period when
the Chicago School’s most prominent intellectual contributions
were made,12 just 41 countries had an antitrust regime in place.13
But by 2010, 127 countries had adopted an antitrust regime.14
Our data thus allow us to examine whether these 86 antitrust
regimes that were adopted after the Chicago School’s prominence
in the US incorporate the insights of the Chicago School into their
regime, and also whether the countries that already had antitrust
regimes amended their laws to reflect Chicago School theories.

12 See Part I.A for an explanation of why we designate this window as the height of
the Chicago School.
13 Data on file with authors.
14 Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud at 412 (cited in note 11).
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FIGURE 1: COUNTRIES WITH ANTITRUST STATUTES, 1900 TO 2010

We specifically use these datasets to examine the influence of
the Chicago School in three areas. First, we examine the goals
and exemptions that countries have codified in their antitrust
statutes. This analysis reveals that many countries have explicitly endorsed ideas in their antitrust laws that are antithetical to
Chicago School theories. For instance, by 2010, 50 percent of
countries with antitrust regimes had explicitly codified goals in
their antitrust laws unrelated to efficiency—including the protection of small companies or promotion of exports.15 Second, we examine the provisions of countries’ antitrust regimes that regulate
unilateral conduct. These data reveal that a majority of countries
with antitrust regimes prohibited several kinds of conduct that
Chicago School scholars had argued were unlikely to reduce competition. For instance, in 2010, 63 percent of countries with antitrust regimes prohibited unfair pricing. Moreover, in 2010, there
were more investigations opened around the world into abuses of
dominance than into cartels. Third, we examine merger review
policies globally. Again, this analysis illustrates that many countries with merger review regimes have laws that incorporate
ideas that were rejected by the Chicago School. For example, by
15

See Figure 3.
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2010, 42 percent of countries with antitrust regimes had merger
defenses unrelated to efficiency—including the promotion of general “public interest.”
That said, from the outset, it is important to acknowledge that
there are several reasons why the global influence of the Chicago
School is difficult to quantify.16 First, the Chicago School’s ideas
are perhaps best understood as a commitment to a certain method
of antitrust enforcement rather than an agreement on specific
policy outcomes. This analytical method—including the general
endorsement of an effects-based analysis of competitive conduct—
may not always have been codified in antitrust laws the way a
clear rule or policy prescription would be, making it difficult to
detect. Second, the ideas associated with the Chicago School are
not always easy to theoretically or empirically separate from
other schools of thought that endorse economic analysis of antitrust laws.17 As a result, our evidence may be best understood as
capturing the diffusion of economic analysis of antitrust laws generally as opposed to the diffusion of the Chicago School ideas specifically. Finally, the primary data we use to study the influence
of the Chicago School are based on countries’ antitrust statutes,
which do not always reflect how laws are enforced in practice.
These limitations may lead us to either under- or overestimate
the extent of Chicago School’s global influence.
Given these limitations, we are unlikely to settle the debate
on the Chicago School’s contribution to international antitrust.
But we hope that our results paint a more nuanced view of the
Chicago School’s thrust than currently exists. Specifically, we
hope to shed light on whether the Chicago School remained
largely a US phenomenon, with a limited ability to shape antitrust thinking abroad, or whether its ideas diffused more broadly.
We also hope that our results help enlighten the ongoing debate
on the potential need to reassess antitrust enforcement, and the
Chicago School, in the United States and beyond.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the Chicago
School’s main ideas. Part II discusses existing evidence on the international influence of the Chicago School and the difficulties
that arise when trying to empirically measure this influence.
Part III describes our data and empirical findings.

16

Part II.C more extensively discusses the limitations of our approach.
See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 933–44 (cited in note 3) (discussing the convergence
between the Chicago and Harvard schools of thought).
17
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I. THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF ANTITRUST
A. Background
The so-called Chicago School is the result of decades of academic scholarship on antitrust law and policy by professors associated with the economics and law departments of the University
of Chicago. While it is hard to pinpoint an exact beginning and
end, the Chicago School is said to have started forming around
the 1950s, reflecting the teaching and influence of the University
of Chicago law professor Aaron Director and the ideas developed
by his students and colleagues, including Professors George
Stigler, Harold Demsetz, Ward Bowman, John McGee, and Lester
Telser, and Judges Robert Bork, Richard Posner, and Frank
Easterbrook.18 More than articulating a cohesive theory on antitrust policy, Director instigated his peers to use microeconomics
and price theory to challenge what were, at the time, key antitrust doctrines related to tie-ins, predatory pricing, and vertical
conduct such as resale price maintenance and exclusive dealing.19
The Chicago School advocated that scholars and courts should focus on the incentives of economic agents and not on the structure
of the market to determine the competitive effects of mergers and
firm conduct.20 This view directly challenged the more structuralist approach associated with the so-called Harvard School, which
was concerned with market concentration.21 By doing so, the Chicago School promoted a more benign view of corporate conduct,
one that warranted less antitrust intervention based on a belief
that markets would largely self-correct while governmental intervention could entrench monopolies.22
The Chicago School’s influence peaked in the 1970s and
1980s.23 The enactment of new federal Merger Guidelines, which

18 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 925–26 (cited in note 3); Andrew I. Gavil, et al,
Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy 71
(West 3d ed 2017).
19 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 928 (cited in note 3); Gavil, et al, Antitrust Law in
Perspective at 72 (cited in note 18); A. Douglas Melamed, et al, Antitrust Law and Trade
Regulation: Cases and Materials 52–53 (Foundation 7th ed 2018).
20 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich L Rev
1696, 1698 (1986).
21 See Gavil, et al, Antitrust Law in Perspective at 70–73 (cited in note 18) (discussing
the shift from a structuralist view to an incentives view).
22 Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 932–33 (cited in note 3); Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust
Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 133 (Basic Books 1978).
23 See Gavil, et al, Antitrust Law in Perspective at 75 (cited in note 18).
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largely reflected the teachings of Chicago School scholars,
demonstrated their profound impact on administrative agencies
tasked with enforcing antitrust laws.24 At the same time, a more
conservative US judiciary also started to incorporate Chicago
School ideas into US case law by reverting or qualifying important antitrust doctrines, such as those around intrabrand vertical restraints or tying.25
The Chicago School’s influence in the United States started
to gradually wane around the 1990s and 2000s, at least in academia.26 Around that time, other scholars began to combine the
Chicago School’s own methodological foundations with a more indepth use of game theory to challenge, or at least qualify, some of
its basic tenets, including rationales for market exclusion and the
Single Monopoly Profit Theorem.27 This criticism of the Chicago
School ideas gave birth to what some have called the post–Chicago
School, which combines industrial organization, game theory, and
empirical tools to measure the extent to which firms compete with
one another.28

24

See id.
See Continental Television, Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US 36, 57 (1977);
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2, 12–18 (1984). See also generally
Reiter v Sonotone Corp, 442 US 330 (1979). Other important cases focused on how to define
antitrust harm and predatory pricing, and other topics that were also impacted by the
work of Harvard scholars like Professors Areeda and Turner. See William E. Kovacic, The
Intellectual DNA of Modern US Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The
Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev 1, 46–47. These scholars warned
of the dangers of overenforcement of antitrust laws by private litigators. See id at 51–54.
See also Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc, 429 US 477, 487 (1977); Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574, 582 (1986); Brooke Group Ltd v
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209, 221–25, 227, 232–33, 238–39 (1993).
26 See Gavil, et al, Antitrust Law in Perspective at 75–77 (cited in note 18) (discussing
the rise of the “post-Chicago” school). The Chicago School still had important wins in the
judiciary, such as the cases around resale price maintenance. See State Oil Co v Khan, 522
US 3, 18 (1997); Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 551 US 877, 907 (2007).
27 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L J 209, 225–27 (1986); Einer
Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory,
123 Harv L Rev 397, 400 (2009); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle
and Execution 38–39 (Harvard 2008).
28 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich L Rev 213, 260–
64 (1985) (discussing how the Chicago School models did not consider appropriately realworld problems and ignored many forms of strategic behavior). See also Gavil, et al, Antitrust Law in Perspective at 76 (cited in note 18). For a review on the problems of these
“School” divisions, see Kovacic, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev at 72–80 (cited in note 25).
25
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B. The Chicago School Approach to Antitrust
The Chicago School approach to antitrust is difficult to summarize because there is variation in the ideas embraced by scholars associated with the School.29 To simplify, we briefly explain
the basic arguments of Judges Bork and Posner in three of their
seminal works: Bork’s Antitrust Paradox, Posner’s Antitrust Law:
An Economic Perspective, and Posner’s The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis.30 We choose to focus on the works of Bork and
Posner not only because of their prominent role as judges who
applied the Chicago School teachings to concrete antitrust cases,
but also because of their tendency to articulate largely similar
and comprehensive views on how the Chicago School should impact antitrust policy.31
According to the Chicago School, the main goal of antitrust
was the promotion of consumer welfare, which Judge Bork understood as general or total welfare.32 The Chicago School ignored
“small-business welfare”33 and the protection of competition for
competition’s sake.34 For instance, it decried the RobinsonPatman Act35 as an example of small-business antitrust that represented unsound redistributive antitrust policy.36 More broadly,
antitrust policy should not concern itself with redistributing surplus between consumers and firms or among different firms. This

29 Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 932 (cited in note 3). See also Einer Elhauge, Harvard,
Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent US Supreme Court Decisions?, 3 Competition Pol Intl 59, 71–72 (2007) (distinguishing “Judge Posner’s Chicago School view”
from “Judge Easterbrook’s Chicago School position”); Bruce H. Kobayashi and Timothy J.
Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond: Time to Let Go of the 20th Century, 78 Antitrust L J 147, 154 (2012) (discussing the “many disagreements regarding the appropriate
scope of policy among Chicago School scholars”).
30
See generally Bork, Antitrust Paradox (cited in note 22); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust
Law: An Economic Perspective (Chicago 1976); Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev 925 (cited in note 3).
31 It is important to acknowledge that Judges Bork and Posner did disagree on important topics, such as how to characterize predatory pricing or the dangers of parallel
conduct. See note 101 and accompanying text.
32 Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 7 (cited in note 22) (“[T]he only legitimate goal of antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare.”).
33 Id at 17, 51.
34 See id at 58–61.
35 49 Stat 1526 (1936), codified as amended at 15 USC § 13.
36 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 64, 386 (cited in note 22).
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type of redistribution is better left for private bargaining, markets, and Congress.37 Nor should antitrust policy be deployed for
the pursuit of industrial policy.
For Chicago School scholars, price theory is the proper lens
to study the competitive behavior of firms.38 Courts should not infer market power from market shares (save at very high concentration levels), and should require parties to demonstrate the existence of market power and consumer harm in order to justify an
antitrust intervention. Judge Bork in particular was against “incipiency” theories—that is, the proposition that courts are able to identify anticompetitive conduct before it takes place.39 The Chicago
view was that false positives are costlier than false negatives because the market has strong incentives to self-correct, while speculative government intervention may lead to consumer harm and
a waste of taxpayer money.40
This enforcement philosophy led the Chicago School to advocate a minimalist antitrust policy that focuses on egregious competitive restraints that have no efficiency justification.41 The goal
was to fight deadweight loss: in particular, output restrictions
that raise consumer prices in an artificial manner.42 Antitrust enforcement should therefore focus on dismantling cartels and preventing large horizontal mergers (that is, mergers between competitors) that lead to inefficient monopolies or facilitate
collusion.43 The Chicago School also warned against using the intent to exclude competitors as a proxy for a competition violation,
as all businesses have the intent to exclude their rivals,44 and argued that consumers would typically benefit from the exclusion of
inefficient rivals.45
The Chicago School’s antitrust minimalism was supported by
the School’s resounding faith in efficient business conduct and
self-correcting markets. The Chicago School promoted the view
37 See id at 55–56 (cited in note 22). Bork specifically rejects granting judges the
power to define trade-offs in terms of winners or losers of economic surplus. Id at 80
(“Striking the balance is essentially a legislative task.”).
38 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 932 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at
117 (cited in note 22).
39 Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 17, 48 (cited in note 22).
40 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 932–33 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox
at 133 (cited in note 22).
41 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 133 (cited in note 22).
42 See id at 35, 122–23.
43 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 928, 933 (cited in note 3).
44 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 39 (cited in note 22).
45 See id at 56.
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that most corporate conduct was efficient, further justifying the
narrow scope for government intervention. This view subsequently translated into an expanded use of the efficiency defense
for all forms of mergers and unilateral conduct.46 Similarly, the
Chicago School emphasized the ability of new entrants to discipline most types of anticompetitive behavior. It thereby attacked
an expansive view of barriers to entry in markets, arguing that
such barriers are less common than conventionally envisioned.47
The presumption that mergers generally lead to efficiencies
lent support for a narrow merger regime limited to reviewing
large, horizontal mergers.48 The Chicago School was not concerned about simple increases in market shares (save at very high
concentration levels).49 It also criticized American courts for neglecting this efficiency justification, in particular the Supreme
Court’s Brown Shoe Co, Inc v United States50 and United States v
Von’s Grocery Co51 decisions.52 The Chicago School scholars defended vertical mergers as generally efficient, asserting that they
rarely lead to foreclosure concerns.53 Similarly, conglomerate
mergers were seen as typically efficient, warranting little antitrust intervention.54
46 See id at 19, 25–26, 88, 111. Here some clarification is needed. Antitrust initially
included efficiency defenses, but the Brandeis Supreme Court movement largely set them
aside. In addition, Judge Bork was initially against an efficiency defense in mergers as
proposed in Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 Am Econ Rev 18, 33 (1968), arguing that courts would not be able to properly
measure it. See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 111–12 (cited in note 22). For him, efficiency
should be largely presumed as a result of mergers. See id. Nonetheless, we believe that
Chicago School scholars were largely responsible for bringing discussions on the efficiency
of mergers back to antitrust policy, similarly to what they have done to discussions around
efficiency in many other areas.
47 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 310–29 (cited in note 22). In particular, the Chicago
School argued that economies of scale, product differentiation, expenditures on advertising and promotion, rebates, and dealership deals and capital requirements in general do
not constitute entry barriers. See id.
48 See id at 221, 231 (arguing that “[horizontal] mergers up to 60 or 70 percent of the
market should be permitted” and that “there is no reason for the law to oppose [vertical]
mergers”).
49 See id at 180–81. That is because many oligopolies were seen as actually competitive.
50 370 US 294 (1962).
51 384 US 270 (1966).
52 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 198–204 (cited in note 22) (attacking the decisions
in Brown Shoe Co and Von’s Grocery Co).
53 See id at 227 (cited in note 22). Cases in which products are not consumed in fixed
proportions may be exceptions, but even in those cases vertical mergers may increase efficiency by enabling price discrimination.
54 See id at 246. Conglomerate mergers are defined as any merger that is neither
horizontal (fear of coordination) nor vertical (fear of foreclosure).
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Chicago School scholars further believed that firms cannot
generally obtain or enhance monopoly power through unilateral
action. This is because, in most cases, firms would just preserve
or gain market share at the expense of profits.55 In addition, antitrust law should not be concerned with attacking companies in
monopolistic or oligopolistic industries when their size has been
achieved by internal growth, as larger firms are normally more
efficient than smaller ones.56 As previously noted, they also
viewed oligopolies as largely competitive.57 Judge Bork goes as far
as to say that exclusionary conduct by dominant firms is a class
of illegal behavior that does not exist.58 For example, predatory
pricing is generally procompetitive, as subsequent attempts to recoup losses from below-cost pricing will inevitably face new entry
that erodes monopoly profits. Even if strategic behavior in specific
circumstances could lead to predatory pricing, the high administrative costs of separating legitimate discounts from predatory
pricing should prevent authorities from focusing enforcement on
such conduct.59 Given the Chicago School’s benevolent view of unilateral conduct, it resisted the idea of breaking up monopolies.60
The Chicago School also viewed many other competition restrictions as efficiency enhancing. For example, intrabrand restraints were seen as generally procompetitive given their tendency to spur interbrand competition.61 Similarly, price
discrimination allowed the monopolist to serve additional consumers and mitigate deadweight loss.62 The Chicago School also emphasized the efficiencies associated with maximum and minimum

55

See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 928 (cited in note 3).
See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 164, 178 (cited in note 22).
57 See id at 103–04, 180–81.
58 See id at 171.
59 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 939–40 (cited in note 3).
60 See id at 944–45; Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 178 (cited in note 22). The reason for
opposing breakups as a remedy was twofold: either competition is feasible, in which case
new entrants are more efficient than governments in transforming uncompetitive oligopolies into competitive markets; or markets are simply not competitive (for example, natural monopolies), in which case breaking up firms would lead to a loss of scale and inefficiencies. Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 944–45 (cited in note 3).
61 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 156–57 (cited in note 22). Interventions in these
cases should be restricted to the few cases in which the market shares of the company
involved are very high (approximately 80–90 percent) and there is proof of intent to harm
competition. Id at 157.
62 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 926 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at
240 (cited in note 22).
56
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resale price maintenance,63 exclusive dealing and long-term contracts,64 territorial restraints,65 conditional discounts,66 and tying.67
II. THE GLOBAL INFLUENCE OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
As the above discussion illustrates, the Chicago School advocated a much smaller role for antitrust enforcement than what
existed at the time in the United States.68 But beyond the acknowledgement of the gradual adoption of antitrust law and economics
in the EU and a few other jurisdictions, there has been limited
scholarship on the whether the Chicago School’s more minimalist
approach—or what Judge Easterbrook called “workable” antitrust policy69—disseminated outside of America. In this Part, we
first discuss what is known about the ways in which Chicago
School ideas—and law and economics more generally—have
shaped antitrust policies around the world. We then explain why
the specific ideas associated with the Chicago School seem to have
gained limited traction. Finally, we address the difficulty of empirically testing the extent of the Chicago School’s influence.
A. What We Know About the Influence of the Chicago School
While a significant body of scholarship discusses the influence of the Chicago School on US antitrust law, we are unaware
of any notable literature examining the influence of the Chicago
School across the world. The existing scholarship recognizes the
international influence of the law and economics movement in
general, but it pays little attention to the role of the Chicago
School in particular. While this literature suggests that law and
economics has gained some traction outside the US, the influence
of the Chicago School seems more tentative.70 Some commentators even suggest that outside the US, “the Chicago model has in
63 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 926 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at
280–81 (cited in note 22).
64 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 927 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at
309 (cited in note 22).
65 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 927 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at
297–98 (cited in note 22).
66 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 326 (cited in note 22).
67 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 926 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at
375 (cited in note 22).
68 See Kovacic, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev at 17–18, 21–22 (cited in note 25).
69 Easterbrook, 84 Mich L Rev at 1700–01 (cited in note 20).
70 See Spencer Weber Waller, The Law and Economics Virus, 31 Cardozo L Rev 367,
401 (2009).
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general been studied more for its pitfalls than for its accuracy and
appropriateness.”71 But the Chicago School ideas may have diffused selectively as part of some foreign jurisdictions’ willingness
to embrace principles associated with law and economics.
In particular, over the last two decades, the law and economics movement has become more influential in some parts of the
world, even though foreign jurisdictions have embraced it more
selectively and deployed its ideas with more caveats compared to
the US.72 As a result, a growing number of antitrust jurisdictions
“are creating, analyzing, and enforcing law with an eye toward its
economic consequences, usually defined in terms of allocative
efficiency.”73 For instance, the Small but Significant and Nontransitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test—an economic test used
to identify the smallest relevant market within which a monopolist could profitably impose a significant increase in price—is now
the most commonly used method for market definition across
jurisdictions.74
The evolution of EU antitrust law illustrates the growing influence of law and economics outside the United States. As of the
late 1990s and early 2000s, the EU has increasingly embraced
economic analysis of antitrust law, including some aspects of the
Chicago School.75 The goal of EU antitrust law has increasingly
centered on consumer welfare:76 the broader goals that characterized the earlier decades of EU’s antitrust policy are no longer key

71 Mel Marquis, Idea Merchants and Paradigm Peddlers in Global Antitrust, 28 Pac
McGeorge Global Bus & Dev L J 155, 203 (2015).
72 See Waller, 31 Cardozo L Rev at 401 (cited in note 70).
73 Id at 368.
74 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Board, The Use of Economic Analysis in Competition Cases *8 (Apr 28, 2009), archived at https://perma.cc/
YX8M-C6VN.
75 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Law and Economics Movement in Europe, 17 Intl Rev L & Econ 3, 5 (1997) (discussing the “rapid growth of the [law
and economics] field in Europe”); Wolfgang Wurmnest, The Reform of Article 82 EC in
Light of the “Economic Approach”, in Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, Beatriz Conde Gallego,
and Stefan Enchelmaier, eds, Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms? 1, 1–2 (Springer 2008) (noting that since the late 1990s, the European Commission’s attempts to modernize EC competition law have been focused on “an
increased role of economics in competition law,” with “strong emphasis [ ] placed on the
promotion of economic efficiency and consumer welfare”).
76 See Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102
TFEU 6 (Hart 2d ed 2013) (“[I]t is more than tolerably clear that consumer welfare is now
the primary objective of EU competition law.”). The interpretation of consumer welfare in
the EU diverges from the United States in important ways, in particular given the requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU. See Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye,
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drivers of EU enforcement, even if some, such as market integration, remain important.77 Various European Commission enforcement guidelines similarly emphasize the effects-based analysis
and the central role of the efficiency defense.78 On mergers, the
European Commission’s approach is similar to the United
States’.79 On unilateral conduct, the Commission has abandoned
its prior, overly formalistic analysis in favor of a more effectsbased analysis of anticompetitive behavior—even if the Commission continues to be criticized for falling short of the economic
analysis endorsed in its own Article 102 guidelines, or deeming
(almost) per se illegal certain types of conduct that are (almost)
per se legal in the United States.80
As evidence of this general shift toward greater acceptance of
economic analysis of EU antitrust law, the former Director General of Competition for the European Commission, Philip Lowe,
argued in a 2003 speech for the need for a “comprehensive reassessment of practice under Article [102] in the light of economic
thinking [because] [a] credible policy on abusive conduct must be
compatible with mainstream economics.”81 Suggesting that the
EU had learned from US doctrine, Lowe emphasized the need to
focus on “economic analysis” and apply economic theory to existing case law.82 The shift in tone took place in merger review after
the European Commission experienced a string of humiliating defeats before the European Court of Justice, which in 2002 overturned three of the Commission’s merger prohibitions at the appeal stage in a close sequence, strongly criticizing the
Commission’s inadequate economic assessment.83 This criticism
prompted the Commission to reassess its antitrust policy, and

and Heike Schweitzer, Competition Policy for the Digital Era *40 (EU 2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/8K4J-Q6BB.
77 See Wurmnest, The Reform of Article 82 EC at 17 (cited in note 75) (noting that
an EU approach to competition law “places welfare considerations next to the traditional
objectives, such as market integration”).
78 See O’Donoghue and Padilla, Article 102 TFEU at 79–80, 225–26 (cited in note 76).
79 See Waller, 31 Cardozo L Rev at 398 (cited in note 70).
80 See O’Donoghue and Padilla, Article 102 TFEU at 270 (cited in note 76); Alison
Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 365 (Oxford
6th ed 2016) (discussing the EU application of effects analysis in unilateral conduct). For
a brief EU/US analysis, see Lancieri, 7 J Antitrust Enforcement at 34–36 (cited in note 4).
81 Philip Lowe, Speech Delivered by Philip Lowe at the Fordham Antitrust Conference
in Washington *2 (Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Oct 23, 2003), archived at
https://perma.cc/B3KN-LGZB.
82 Id at *3, 7.
83 See Waller, 31 Cardozo L Rev at 397–98 (cited in note 70).
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contributed to its greater willingness to embrace economic analysis as a cornerstone of the EU’s antitrust enforcement. A 2009
study by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) also documents the shift in EU antitrust policy,
citing the recent reforms in EU antitrust law “from a form-based
towards a more effects-based approach [as] an example of greater
reliance on economic analysis.”84 In particular, the UNCTAD emphasizes the EU’s adoption of the SSNIP test for defining relevant
markets in 1997, the revision of its rules on vertical and horizontal restraints in 1999 and 2000, and its revised merger regulations in 2004 and 2007.85
Despite these developments, many key elements of EU antitrust law that are contrary to Chicago School principles have remained intact. For example, the EU continues to challenge vertical and conglomerate mergers contrary to the Chicago School’s
teachings that emphasize these types of mergers’ procompetitive
effects.86 In a similarly stark departure from the Chicago School
ideas, vertical agreements that contain territorial restrictions or
restrict the resale price of goods or services often lead to per se
antitrust liability in the EU.87 Additionally, the EU treats exclusionary conduct by dominant firms with suspicion and actively
pursues these firms’ tying, discounting, exclusive dealing, as well
as predatory, discriminatory, or unfair pricing practices.88 By continuing to subject such a broad range of conduct to antitrust scrutiny, the EU shows it has not relinquished its rather “maximalist”
approach to antitrust, which is antithetical to the Chicago
School’s antitrust minimalism.
Some scholars have suggested that the way law professors
and students are trained explains why law and economics takes
hold in certain places. For example, Professor Spencer Weber
Waller argues that law and economics became more influential in
the EU as increasing “direct study and personal, professional, and

84 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Board, The Use of Economic Analysis at *3 (cited in note 74).
85 See id at *3 n 3.
86 See Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud at 436 (cited in note 11).
87 See Ioannis Apostolakis, Resale Price Maintenance and Absolute Territorial Protection: Single Market Integration, the Ancillary Restraints Doctrine and the Application
of Article 101 TFEU to Vertical Agreements, 38 World Competition 215, 215–17 (2015);
Bhawna Gulati, Minimum Resale Price Maintenance Agreements: Economic & Commercial Justifications, 9 Manchester J Intl Econ L 92, 95 (2012).
88 Waller, 31 Cardozo L Rev at 395 & nn 97–98 (cited in note 70).
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academic contacts between the U.S. and E.U. competition communities . . . inevitably expose[d] E.U. decision-makers to Chicago
School jurisprudence.”89 Similarly, in Japan, law and economics
became more prominent as young Japanese faculty were increasingly completing at least part of their training in the United
States.90 One empirical study attributed the popularity of law and
economics in some countries, but not others, to different structural incentives in each academic community: in countries such
as Israel, the Netherlands, and the United States, writing law
and economics papers is viewed as more valuable when considering academic appointments and promotions, leading to greater influence of law and economics there in comparison to countries like
Germany.91
Frequent interactions among antitrust enforcers have also
contributed to the dissemination of economic theories. The US
and the EU antitrust agencies have concluded several bilateral
cooperation agreements with their foreign counterparts.92 These
formalized channels of interaction, together with cooperation on
technical assistance and training, have enabled greater diffusion
of basic economic theories underlying antitrust enforcement in
the US and the EU.93 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and the International Competition
Network have also provided important settings for voluntary cooperation and diffusion of best practices, including economic analysis of antitrust law. However, these networks have not fully embraced the Chicago School’s vision of antitrust law. Instead, they
have endorsed a more expansive notion of antitrust enforcement
while emphasizing the benefits of economic principles as a foundation of sound antitrust policy.

89

Id at 397.
See Shozo Ota, Law and Economics in Japan: Hatching Stage, 11 Intl Rev L &
Econ 301, 302 (1991); J. Mark Ramseyer, Law and Economics in Japan, 2011 Ill L Rev
1455, 1461.
91 See Oren Gazal-Ayal, Economic Analysis of “Law & Economics”, 35 Cap U L Rev
787, 797–803 (2007).
92 See Marquis, 28 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev L J at 176 (cited in note 71).
93 See id at 177 (noting that the first general bilateral agreements “enabled agencies
to build a communicative infrastructure and to intensify personal contacts, develop trust,
and exchange expertise”).
90
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B. Why the Chicago School’s International Influence May Be
Limited
The growing popularity of law and economics in some jurisdictions raises the question why the Chicago School has had a
more limited international influence. One explanation is that the
Chicago School never intended to have a global reach. Its creators
and promoters were primarily focused on transforming American
antitrust doctrine and lacked any self-conscious objective to
spread its teachings abroad. Yet the absence of a “missionary
agenda” likely also reflects the thin international antitrust landscape at the height of the Chicago School’s influence. Only fortyone jurisdictions had adopted an antitrust law by 1979.94 Few
likely predicted in the early 1970s that the world in 2019 would
have over 130 jurisdictions with a domestic antitrust law or saw
the extent to which the conduct of US corporations would be constrained by EU and other foreign antitrust regulators.95 Thus,
there was no perceived need to internationalize the Chicago
School ideas at the time.
More recently, there has been a growing understanding in
the United States of the globalization of antitrust law, which has
led to a more concerted effort to export US-style antitrust laws
and economics abroad. However, by the time the significant internationalization of antitrust law had become clear, the more coherent ideas of the Chicago School had given way to a more diffuse set of economic ideologies, shaped by multiple different
schools of thought. Thus, when the DOJ and the FTC began to
engage with their foreign counterparts in earnest in the late
1990s, their “export product” was a more diluted version of the
Chicago School. In other words, the economic principles they endorsed no longer followed the pure tenants of Chicago School
ideas, and they instead embraced variations of Harvard School
and post–Chicago School economics that had since become mainstream in US antitrust thinking.
Relatedly, what may also have compromised the direct influence of the Chicago School ideas is the lack of a scholarly consensus over which facets of US antitrust law were actually influenced
by them, as opposed to a hybrid Chicago-Harvard or post-Chicago
ideas. If this was not clear in the United States, it was likely even
less clear for any foreign jurisdiction looking to import ideas from
94
95

Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud at 417 (cited in note 11).
Id.
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abroad. Any country seeking to emulate US antitrust policies
hence was less likely to make the distinction among these variants of economic thinking, adopting some elements of each as opposed to any pure variant of the Chicago School. Further, even
those elements were more likely adopted to fit the local needs and
circumstances, further blending the theories that came to guide
the various domestic antitrust laws.
What may have further compromised the global diffusion of
Chicago School ideas is that by the time most foreign jurisdictions
adopted an antitrust law, they had an alternative antitrust model
to follow and often preferred to turn to the EU antitrust laws instead. While the United States has attempted to promote the “development of sound antitrust laws” abroad,96 historically, the EU
system has had more direct influence on countries seeking to implement competition policies for the first time.97 There are several
reasons for this, including that the EU actively promotes its
model through preferential trade agreements and has an administrative template that is easy to emulate due to its relative statutory precision.98 Former FTC Chairman William E. Kovacic suggests that unlike the EU, the United States does not have the
consolidated bargaining power to induce potential trade partners
into adopting its antitrust models; it instead must persuade those
jurisdictions that its experience and theories are superior.99 The
United States’ attempts to emphasize the superiority of its policy,
however, have rarely been successful. Indeed, we show elsewhere

96

Wendell L. Willkie II, Antitrust Goes International, 59 Antitrust L J 563, 563 (1991).
Anu Bradford, et al, The Global Dominance of European Competition Law over
American Antitrust Law, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud 731, 739–40, 745 (2019) (examining
126 countries’ first competition law adopted and finding that more countries have implemented laws similar to the EU than to the US).
98 Id at 755, 759. See also William E. Kovacic, The United States and Its Future Influence on Global Competition Policy, 22 Geo Mason L Rev 1157, 1157 (2015) (suggesting
that “the compatibility of the EU’s antitrust institutions with civil law states that were
new adopters of competition law contributed to its increased influence”); Dina I. Waked,
Adoption of Antitrust Laws in Developing Countries: Reasons and Challenges, 12 J L Econ
& Pol 193, 202 (2016) (noting that “the EU has been extremely active in the process of
spreading its competition law to developing countries . . . to the extent where some argue
that today the EC competition law is the dominant model of competition law in the world”)
(quotation marks omitted).
99 See Kovacic, 22 Geo Mason L Rev at 1159–60 (cited in note 98). See also Marquis,
28 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev L J at 181–82 (cited in note 71) (suggesting that “unlike the EU, the U.S. may not hold a comparable trump card strong enough to insist on an
isomorphic remodeling of its trade partner’s substantive arrangements in the field of competition law”).
97
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how the EU’s antitrust model eclipsed that of the US in the 1990s
as the template for new antitrust jurisdictions.100
However, the EU’s gradual adoption of economic analysis, in
turn, may have contributed to the diffusion of the law and economics movement around the world. Thus, the United States’
ideas of antitrust law and economics have most successfully diffused only once the EU started to embrace and promote them as
part of its own legal regime. Yet the EU never embraced a strong
version of the Chicago School and has been hesitant to spread
many of its principles. This partially explains why the variant of
law and economics that has gained traction abroad is the variant
embraced by the EU. As we show in the next Part, many jurisdictions around the world continue to follow the EU’s lead in prohibiting a broad range of anticompetitive conduct by a monopolist
and restricting many types of vertical agreements that the Chicago
School considered per se procompetitive. However, by recognizing
efficiency defenses and enforcing their laws against the benchmarks of consumer welfare or efficiency, these jurisdictions also
acknowledge the broader contours of law and economics as key to
their antitrust policies.
Even though the Chicago School’s international influence
may be limited in practice, an argument could be made that the
Chicago School’s philosophy would have served many foreign jurisdictions well. The Chicago School’s minimalist doctrine could
well have been simpler for many jurisdictions to follow compared
to the more nuanced analytical models associated with post–
Chicago School scholarship. This may be true in particular for
countries with few resources and hence the ability to engage only
in selective antitrust interventions. The inadequate economics
training of many agencies and judges in some countries may
make it difficult for those jurisdictions to pursue conduct when
pro- and anticompetitive effects are difficult to separate. For example, unilateral conduct, vertical agreements, and vertical mergers are difficult to investigate as they often present complex
trade-offs between pro- and anticompetitive effects. The narrow
focus on hard-core cartels or horizontal mergers could therefore
have presented a legitimate enforcement agenda that would have
been more feasible to carry out.

100

Bradford, et al, J Empirical Legal Stud at 734 (cited in note 97).
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Despite the advantage of the Chicago School’s narrow enforcement agenda, some jurisdictions may not have had the domestic support for the strong promarket ideology that was associated with the Chicago School. For instance, the markets in some
developing countries were less robust and more prone to failure,
inviting an antitrust agenda that was broader and more interventionist. Also, public support for the pursuit of unilateral conduct
by monopolies was high in many of the jurisdictions, in particular
in economies where the state still controls many large enterprises
or where privatization has merely shifted the ownership of large
conglomerates from public to private hands. There was thus no
fertile political economy ground for the Chicago School ideas in
their pure forms to take hold.
C. Why the Chicago School Influence Is Difficult to Test
Testing the international influence of the Chicago School empirically is difficult, which likely explains the few attempts to do
so to date. As mentioned in the Introduction, our own attempt
faces three important limitations: (1) the Chicago School is a commitment to analytical methods rather than specific statutory provisions or policy outcomes; (2) the Chicago School’s propositions
are intertwined with the broader growth of the law and economics
movement; and (3) our database reflects mostly antitrust statutes
around the world, which may fail to capture subtleness in policy
changes. While we do our best in this Essay to overcome these
limitations, we readily acknowledge them.
First, as we explained in Part I.B, the Chicago School was
more of a commitment to deploy certain methods, like price theory, to understand firm behavior than it was a specific substantive philosophy. This means that even Chicago School scholars
disagreed on policy outcomes.101 This creates two challenges: first,
it allows us to, in theory, pick the most favorable results to our
analysis and then justify them on some variation of the Chicago
School; and second, the Chicago School methods normally lead to

101 For example, Judges Bork and Posner disagreed on how to treat predation claims,
with Bork advocating an almost per se legality to predation and Posner affirming that it
can be damaging in specific circumstances. Compare Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 154 (cited
in note 22) (concluding that “[i]t seems unwise” to create predatory pricing rules, because
predation likely does not exist or exists only in rare cases), with Posner, Antitrust Law at
187 (cited in note 30) (arguing that predatory pricing should not be freely permitted and
noting the “social costs” of predation). See also generally Fred S. McChesney, Antitrust
and Regulation: Chicago’s Contradictory Views, 10 Cato J 775 (1991).
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most forms of firm behavior being evaluated under the rule of reason—a process not always reflected in formal rules that form the
core of our database.
Second, some of the ideas associated with the Chicago School
are somewhat intertwined with a more general use of economic
analysis of law. This is a limitation that we cannot effectively address. Therefore, the results below, to the extent they indicate a
spread of the Chicago School, can be interpreted more broadly to
capture the diffusion of economic analysis of antitrust laws generally as opposed to specific diffusion of the Chicago School’s
ideas—although the Chicago School was a key driver behind the
emergence and evolution of economic analysis of antitrust.
Third, the data we deploy to study the Chicago School’s influence consists of comprehensive coding of the world’s antitrust
statutes and selected aggregate information on enforcement actions taken by antitrust authorities around the world. To the extent that these laws and cases do not reflect the actual enforcement
practice of a given country, our results may underestimate or overestimate the extent of the Chicago School’s global influence.102
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
We are not aware of previous attempts to study empirically
the international influence of the Chicago School. The goal of this
study is therefore to explore the international influence of the
Chicago School with the help of novel data. We first briefly introduce our data on antitrust laws and enforcement around the
world. We then examine whether countries’ antitrust regimes are
consistent with Chicago School ideas in three ways: (1) the goals
and exemptions they explicitly incorporate into their antitrust
laws, (2) their regulation of unilateral conduct, and (3) their provisions on the review of mergers.
A. Data
In order to test the international influence of the Chicago
School, we use data that we recently collected as part of the Comparative Competition Law Project.103 We specifically draw from

102 An example is the Robinson-Patman Act in the United States, which is still on the
books but rarely enforced by courts. See D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-Patman, 83
Geo Wash L Rev 2064, 2080 (2015). Our database would indicate that this law is against
the teachings of the Chicago School, while actual enforcement data would say otherwise.
103 See generally Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud (cited in note 11).
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two distinct datasets. Although these datasets both have limitations, we believe they provide the most comprehensive picture
currently available of antitrust regimes around the world. To provide a sense of their scope, Figure 2 shows the countries that are
included in at least one of the datasets.
FIGURE 2: COUNTRIES IN THE COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW
AND ENFORCEMENT DATASETS

First, our data on antitrust laws is from the Comparative
Competition Law Dataset.104 This dataset was constructed over a
period of six years by employing a team of over seventy Columbia
Law School students with relevant legal training and language
skills.105 To construct the dataset, we first identified all the antitrust statues, relevant sector-specific regulations, and other laws
that contained provisions related to regulating market competition that any jurisdiction with an antitrust regime had passed at
any time prior to 2010. For each law, we had two coders complete
a 171-part survey that documented relevant elements of the jurisdictions’ antitrust regime, including whether it, for example,
prohibits resale price maintenance, provides for criminal sanctions, or recognizes a public interest defense in merger reviews. We
then had a third, more experienced, coder review discrepancies
and create a final consensus coding for every antitrust provision.

104 For a more detailed explanation of this dataset, see Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical
Legal Stud at 415–24 (cited in note 11).
105 Id at 416.
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In total, we coded 700 laws for 131 jurisdictions, including 126
countries and 5 regional organizations.106
These data focus on the antitrust laws codified in statutes.
This may seem like a significant limitation from the US perspective as courts play a major role in the development of antitrust
law in the US. However, this is not the case in most countries.107
To confirm this, we conducted an expert survey of antitrust experts from around the world that asked about the role that courts
play in the development of antitrust law.108 In total, 166 experts
from 86 countries completed our survey. Of those countries, the
experts responded that courts play a large or extensive role in the
development of antitrust law in just twelve countries.109 As a result, for most countries, our coding of countries’ antitrust laws on
the books should accurately capture the content of their antitrust
regimes.
Second, our data on antitrust enforcement is from the Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset.110 This dataset was
constructed over a period of five years by employing a team of over
forty Columbia Law School and University of Chicago Law School
students that also had relevant legal training and language skills.
To construct this dataset, we identified jurisdictions with an antitrust agency in place any time between 1990 and 2010. We collected publicly available information on variables such as the
agencies’ resources (for example, staff and budget), investigations
opened, and investigations closed with remedies. After reviewing
all publicly available information for each agency, we then created specifically tailored questionnaires that we sent directly to
each agency to ask for more information on their enforcement activities. Through this process, 103 agencies provided us with at
least some data and, in total, we were able to collect at least some
data from 112 agencies across 100 jurisdictions.111

106 Id at 417. There are four jurisdictions that we are aware of having an antitrust
regime prior to 2010 for which we were unable to code: ASEAN, Djibouti, the Faroe Islands, and Iran. Id at 413 n 4.
107 See id at 419.
108 For more information on the survey, see Anu Bradford and Adam S. Chilton, Trade
Openness and Antitrust Law, 62 J L & Econ 29, 48–49 (2019).
109 Id. The twelve countries that received an average score of 4 or higher are: Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Spain,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id at 49 n 15.
110 For a more detailed explanation of this dataset, see Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical
Legal Stud at 424–37 (cited in note 11).
111 Id at 425–26.
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B. Goals and Exemptions
We begin by exploring the goals that countries explicitly state
in their antitrust statutes. As previously noted, the Chicago School
emphasizes that the appropriate goals of antitrust policy are related to efficiency. But instead of following Chicago School teachings and stipulating that the goals of their antitrust regime are
simply efficiency, consumer welfare, or total welfare (“EfficiencyRelated Goals”), some countries explicitly articulate goals aimed
at broader industrial or social policy (“Non-Efficiency-Related
Goals”).
Figure 3 shows the proportion of countries with an antitrust
law in place in a given year that articulated only EfficiencyRelated goals, only Non-Efficiency-Related Goals, both types of
goals, or no explicit goals. It reveals that, through 1990, roughly
70 percent of regimes did not explicitly stipulate any goals. After
1990, there was an increase in the number of countries that explicitly stipulated exclusively Efficiency-Related Goals: by 2010,
14 percent of countries had goals codified in their antitrust statutes that were exclusively Efficiency-Related. However, even
more countries adopted goals that were not purely related to efficiency: by 2010, 16 percent of countries had goals codified in their
antitrust statutes that were exclusively Non-Efficiency-Related
and 33 percent of countries had goals codified in their antitrust
statutes that were both Efficiency and Non-Efficiency Related. In
other words, of the countries that stipulated goals in their antitrust statutes, just 22 percent focused exclusively on efficiency.
Or put another way, contrary to the teachings of the Chicago
School, 50 percent of countries with antitrust regimes had explicitly codified Non-Efficiency-Related Goals in their antitrust laws
by 2010.
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FIGURE 3: PREVALENCE OF EFFICIENCY-RELATED GOALS IN
ANTITRUST STATUTES

In addition to rejecting the use of antitrust policy to advance
goals unrelated to efficiency, the Chicago School unambiguously
rejected the use of antitrust policy for protectionist ends or to advance industrial policy. Of course, countries are unlikely to explicitly stipulate that industrial policy is a goal of their antitrust
law. Instead, if a country is using antitrust policy in pursuit of
industrial policy, it is more likely to exempt categories of enterprises from the scope of its antitrust regime.
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FIGURE 4: PREVALENCE OF ENTERPRISE EXEMPTIONS IN
ANTITRUST STATUTES

To test this, Figure 4 reports the proportion of countries with
an antitrust law in place in a given year that provide complete
exemptions to certain categories of enterprises.112 Panel A specifically breaks out countries that include an explicit exemption for
state-owned enterprises or state-operated enterprises. It makes
clear that, while these exemptions are rare, they do exist. For instance, by 2010, 7 percent of countries included them in their antitrust laws. Panel B breaks out countries that have other kinds
of enterprise exemptions. These include, for example, designated
monopolies or export cartels. Again, although the majority of
countries do not include any of these complete exemptions in their
antitrust regimes, they have remained common. In 1980, they
were included in 41 percent of countries’ antitrust laws, and by
2010, they were included in 37 percent of countries’ antitrust
laws. In other words, although the proportion of countries has
112 Our dataset codes whether countries’ antitrust laws included either complete or
partial enterprise exemptions. Figure 4, however, only graphs countries with complete enterprise exemptions. This is because, depending on the type and their rationale, partial
exemptions may be consistent with the economic theories advanced by the Chicago School.
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slightly decreased since the Chicago School emerged, over a third
of countries with antitrust regimes have exempted entire categories of enterprises from the scope of those laws.
FIGURE 5: PREVALENCE OF INDUSTRY EXEMPTIONS

Finally, another way to examine if a country’s antitrust policy is used to pursue industrial policy is to examine if it exempts
entire industries from the scope of its antitrust laws. Figure 5 reports the proportion of countries with an antitrust law in place in
a given year that exempt at least one industry entirely from the
scope of their laws. Again, this trend has also notably increased
over time, and the increase has been pronounced in the period
after the height of the Chicago School in the 1970s. In 1950,
26 percent of countries had an industry exemption; in 1990,
49 percent of countries had an industry exemption; and by 2010,
50 percent of countries exempted at least one industry from their
antitrust regime.
C. Unilateral Conduct
One of the defining features of the Chicago School was its
skepticism of the need to police unilateral conduct by monopolies.
By emphasizing the importance of scale economies, the Chicago
School often viewed large firms as efficient and argued that such
firms’ unilateral actions likely improved consumer welfare. As a
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result, antitrust authorities should refrain from challenging various types of unilateral conduct that traditional antitrust law had
condemned as anticompetitive. As Figure 6 shows, however,
many countries’ antitrust laws continued to directly address a
range of unilateral conduct. Notably, in 2010, 63 percent of countries with antitrust regimes included provisions prohibiting unfair pricing, while 72 percent prohibited discriminatory pricing.
Figure 6 thus suggests that many countries that passed laws after the Chicago School’s peak of influence in the United States
continued to draft laws that prohibited conduct that Chicago
School scholars argued was unlikely to reduce efficiency. In addition, the data show that only 37 percent of countries allowed efficiency defenses in unilateral conduct investigations—a Chicago
School scholar would argue that efficiency defenses should be allowed in all unilateral cases. On the other hand, 24 percent of
countries allowed a public interest defense, something that falls
clearly outside of the Chicago School framework.
FIGURE 6: PREVALENCE OF PROHIBITIONS ON UNILATERAL
CONDUCT

Chicago School philosophy would suggest that cartel enforcement should be the focus of antitrust policy whereas few resources
should be dedicated to challenge unilateral conduct. To examine
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whether countries have followed this philosophy, Figure 7 compares enforcement activities for both cartel and unilateral conduct cases from countries around the world from 1990 to 2010.
Contrary to the Chicago School ideas, Figure 7 suggests that,
around the world between 1990 and 2010, the agencies that reported their activities carried out considerably more unilateral
conduct investigations than cartel investigations. For instance, in
2010, there were 1,495 cartel investigations and 4,128 abuse of
dominance investigations around the world. The same story
emerges for investigations that were actually closed with remedies. In 2010, there were 388 cartel investigations that were
closed with fine or other remedies, which is a small number compared to the 1,617 abuse of dominance investigations that were
closed with remedies.
FIGURE 7: COMPARING THE ENFORCEMENT AGAINST CARTELS
AND UNILATERAL CONDUCT

That said, the enforcement data behind Figure 7 have limitations. Notably, the total number of investigations and remedies
are likely undercounted because not all agencies reported their
data. Moreover, these data count all investigations as equal, and
thus do not tell us anything about the amount of resources that
were dedicated to each investigation. For instance, it is possible
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that the unilateral conduct investigations were small while the
cartel investigations were more substantial. Finally, an extremely large percentage of the abuse of dominance investigations were initiated by a single country: Russia. In 2010, for example, Russia initiated 66 percent of the world’s abuse of
dominance investigations (2,736 out of 4,128 total). In 2010, Russia
also was responsible for an astounding 90 percent of the world’s
abuse of dominance investigations closed with remedies (1,453
out of 1,617 total). In comparison, Russia was responsible for
41 percent (607 out of 1,495 total) of the world’s cartel investigations in 2010 and for 52 percent (393 out of 756 total) of the
world’s cartel cases closed with remedies in 2009 (Russia did not
provide data on cartel investigations closed with remedies for
2010). There are several reasons for Russia’s distinct enforcement
pattern, including that the Russian agency also uses antitrust
law to curb inflation and to control prices.113 Although Russia was
the world leader of abuse of dominance cases, even excluding
Russia, the rest of the world still opened more abuse of dominance
investigations than cartel investigations in 2010. This provides at
least some evidence that countries have ignored the Chicago
School teachings according to which unilateral conduct should
rarely be the focus of antitrust enforcement.
D. Merger Review
As previously explained, another area in which the Chicago
School was critical of existing antitrust doctrine was merger review. Indeed, as seen above, Judge Bork scolded the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Brown Shoe Co, Inc v United States and
United States v Von’s Grocery Co, and affirmed the primacy of allocative efficiency as the core criterion to evaluate a transaction
among two competitors.
Therefore, another way to indirectly assess the influence of
the Chicago School is to look at the types of defenses that companies can invoke when confronted with a challenge to their proposed transaction. The existence of an efficiency defense in a jurisdiction recognizes the procompetitive benefits of mergers and
is therefore very much in line with the Chicago School’s teachings.
The opposite is true if countries allow for other non-efficiencyrelated public policy considerations to inform merger review.
113 OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 2011 *81 (OECD, Dec 2011), archived at https://perma.cc/WF7J-YL23.
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FIGURE 8: PREVALENCE OF EFFICIENCY AND PUBLIC INTEREST
MERGER DEFENSES

Figure 8 graphs the prevalence of merger defenses in antitrust regimes around the world from 1950 to 2010. More specifically, for countries with an antitrust statute, it shows the share
of countries that had an efficiency defense, a public interest defense, both defenses, or neither defense. Notably, the share of
countries with explicit defenses in their statutes has increased
over time. By 2010, only 36 percent of countries had neither efficiency nor public interest defenses. Instead, 22 percent of countries had only efficiency defenses, 8 percent had only public interest defenses, and 34 percent of countries had both efficiency and
public interest defenses. Taken together, Figure 8 reveals that
42 percent of countries with antitrust regimes had adopted merger defenses unrelated to efficiency reasons by 2010—in opposition to the Chicago School’s teachings.
CONCLUSION
Judges Posner and Bork published their treatises more than
forty years ago, marking one of the high points of decades of intellectual work by scholars associated with the University of
Chicago. Since then, antitrust policy has undergone a revolution:
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US antitrust enforcement changed significantly, reflecting many
of the teachings of the Chicago School. In the decades that followed, antitrust regimes around the world also multiplied. However, despite the Chicago School’s vast influence in the United
States, the evidence we have presented in this Essay suggests
that the Chicago School’s international penetration was less pervasive than many would imagine.
More recently, as public attention in the United States has
begun to focus on increased market concentration, lessening competition, and rising economic inequality,114 the US Congress and
enforcement agencies are facing mounting calls to strengthen the
antitrust laws and their enforcement. Many influential scholars
are arguing that the United States needs to rethink its approach
to antitrust policy,115 with some specifically blaming the Chicago
School for providing the intellectual foundation for the lax US antitrust enforcement of the past decades.116 While our research
does not directly address whether the Chicago School was too lenient on large corporations, or whether and how US antitrust policy should be reformed, our data provide a more nuanced view of
the Chicago School’s global reach. It also suggests that, if the
United States wants to reevaluate many of the core Chicago
School teachings and reinvigorate its antitrust enforcement, it
has many examples around the world to turn to.

114 See World Economic Outlook: Growth Slowdown, Precarious Recovery *56–58
(IMF, Apr 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/AL4Z-THLV (studying almost one million
firms to answer questions regarding market power, its effect on income distribution, and
whether market competition needs to be strengthened).
115 See, for example, Jonathan B. Baker, The Antitrust Paradigm: Restoring a Competitive Economy 2–7 (Harvard 2019); Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton, and E. Glen
Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 Antitrust L J 669, 669–70 (2017); Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner, and Glen Weyl, Antitrust
Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 Harv L Rev 536, 547–49 (2018) (arguing that FTC
and DOJ should enforce antitrust laws more often in labor market concentration cases).
116 See, for example, Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale L J 710,
717–37 (2017); Maurice E. Stucke and Marshall Steinbaum, The Effective Competition
Standard: A New Standard for Antitrust, 87 U Chi L Rev 595, 597–601 (2020).

